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ABSTRACT
While there has been great interest in generating imperceptible adversarial ex-
amples in continuous data domain (e.g. image and audio) to explore the model
vulnerabilities, generating adversarial text in the discrete domain is still challeng-
ing. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a general targeted attack
framework AdvCodec for adversarial text generation which addresses the chal-
lenge of discrete input space and is easily adapted to general natural language
processing (NLP) tasks. In particular, we propose a tree based autoencoder to en-
code discrete text data into continuous vector space, upon which we optimize the
adversarial perturbation. A tree based decoder is then applied to ensure the gram-
mar correctness of the generated text. It also enables the flexibility of making
manipulations on different levels of text, such as sentence (AdvCodec(Sent))
and word (AdvCodec(Word)) levels. We consider multiple attacking scenar-
ios, including appending an adversarial sentence or adding unnoticeable words to
a given paragraph, to achieve arbitrary targeted attack. To demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed method, we consider two most representative NLP tasks:
sentiment analysis and question answering (QA). Extensive experimental results
and human studies show that AdvCodec generated adversarial text can success-
fully attack the neural models without misleading the human. In particular, our
attack causes a BERT-based sentiment classifier accuracy to drop from 0.703 to
0.006, and a BERT-based QA model’s F1 score to drop from 88.62 to 33.21 (with
best targeted attack F1 score as 46.54). Furthermore, we show that the white-box
generated adversarial texts can transfer across other black-box models, shedding
light on an effective way to examine the robustness of existing NLP models. Our
code is available: https://github.com/aisecure/AdvCodec.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent studies have demonstrated that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to carefully
crafted adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016; Eykholt et al., 2017;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). While there are a lot of successful attacks proposed in the con-
tinuous data domain including images, audios, and videos, how to effectively generate adversarial
examples in the discrete text domain still remains a hard problem. There are several challenges for
generating adversarial text: 1) most existing gradient-based adversarial attack approaches are not
directly applicable to the discrete structured data; 2) it is less clear how to appropriately measure the
naturalness of the generated text compared to the original ones; 3) the manipulation space of text is
limited, and it is unclear whether generating a new appended sentence or manipulating individual
words will affect human judgements.
So far, existing works on adversarial text generation either leverage heuristic solutions such as ge-
netic algorithms (Jin et al., 2019) to search for potential adversarial sentences, or are limited to
attacking specific NLP tasks (Cheng et al., 2018; Lei et al., 2018). In addition, effective targeted
attacks have not been achieved by current attacks for any task. In this paper, we aim to provide
more insights towards solving these challenges by proposing a unified optimization framework
AdvCodec to generate adversarial text against general NLP tasks. In particular, the core component
of AdvCodec is a tree based autoencoder which converts discrete text tokens into continuous se-
mantic embedding, upon which the adversarial perturbation will be optimized regarding the chosen
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adversarial target. Finally, a tree based decoder will decode the generated adversarial continuous
embedding vector back to the sentence level based on the tree grammar rules, aiming to both pre-
serve the original semantic meaning and linguistic coherence. An iterative process can be applied
here to ensure the attack success rate.
In addition to the general adversarial text generation framework AdvCodec, this paper also aims to
explore several scientific questions: 1) Since AdvCodec allows the flexibility of manipulating on
different hierarchies of the tree structures, which is more attack effective and which way preserves
better grammatical correctness? 2) Is it possible to achieve targeted attack for general NLP tasks
such as sentiment classification and QA, given the limited degree of freedom for manipulation? 3)
Is it possible to perform blackbox attack in general NLP tasks? 4) Is BERT robust in practice? 5)
Do these adversarial examples affect human reader performances?
To address the above questions, we explore two types of tree based autoencoders on the word
(AdvCodec(Word)) and sentence level (AdvCodec(Sent)). For each encoding scenario,
we generate adversarial text against different sentiment classification and QA models. Compared
with the state-of-the-art adversarial text generation methods, our approach achieves significantly
higher untargeted and targeted attack success rate. In addition, we perform both whitebox and
blackbox settings for each attack to evaluate the model vulnerabilities. Within each attack setting,
we evaluate attack strategies as appending an additional adversarial sentence or adding scatter of ad-
versarial words to a paragraph, to evaluate the quantitative attack effectiveness. To provide thorough
adversarial text quality assessment, we also perform 7 groups of human studies to evaluate the qual-
ity of generated adversarial text compared with the baselines methods, and whether human can still
get the ground truth answers for these tasks based on adversarial text. We find that: 1) both word and
sentence level attacks can achieve high attack success rate, while the sentence level manipulation
can consider the global grammatical constraints and generate high quality adversarial sentences. 2)
various targeted attacks on general NLP tasks are possible (e.g. when attacking QA, we can ensure
the target to be a specific answer or a specific location within a sentence); 3) the transferability based
blackbox attacks are successful in NLP tasks. Transferring adversarial text from stronger models (in
terms of performances) to weaker ones is more successful; 4) Although BERT has achieved state-of-
the-art performances, we observe the performance drops are also larger than other standard models
when confronted with adversarial examples, which indicates BERT is not robust under the adversar-
ial settings; 5) Most human readers are not sensitive to our adversarial examples and can still answer
the right answers when confronted with the adversary-injected paragraphs.
In summary, our main contribution lies on: (1) We propose a general adversarial text generation
framework AdvCodec that addresses the challenge of discrete text input to achieve targeted attacks
against general NLP tasks (e.g. sentiment classification and QA) while preserving the semantic
meaning and linguistic coherence; (2) we propose a novel tree-based text autoencoder that ensures
the grammar correctness of generated text; (3) we conduct extensive experiments and successfully
attack different sentiment classifiers and QA models with significant higher attack success rate than
the state-of-the-art baseline methods; (4) we also perform comprehensive ablation studies including
evaluating the attack scenarios of appending an adversarial sentence or adding scatter of adversarial
words, as well as appending the adversarial sentence at different positions within a paragraph, and
draw several interesting conclusions; (5) we leverage extensive human studies to show that the
adversarial text generated by AdvCodec is natural and effective to attack neural models, while
barely affecting human’s judgement.
2 RELATED WORK
A large body of works on adversarial examples focus on perturbing the continuous input space.
Though some progress has been made on generating adversarial perturbations in the discrete space,
several challenges still remain unsolved. For example, Zhao et al. (2017) exploit the generative
adversarial network (GAN) to generate natural adversarial text. However, this approach cannot ex-
plicitly control the quality of the generated instances. Most existing methods (Liang et al., 2017;
Samanta & Mehta, 2017; Jia & Liang, 2017; Li et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019) apply heuristic strategies
to synthesize adversarial text: 1) first identify the features (e.g. characters, words, and sentences)
that have the influence on the prediction, 2) follow different search strategies to perturb these features
with the constructed perturbation candidates (e.g. typos, synonyms, antonyms, frequent words). For
instance, Liang et al. (2017) employ the loss gradient∇L to select important characters and phrases
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Paragraph: “Super Bowl 50 
was an American football game 
… The game was played on 
February 7, 2016, at Levi's 
Stadium in the San Francisco 
Bay Area at Santa Clara, 
California. As this was the 50th 
Super Bowl, the league 
emphasized the "golden 
anniversary" with various gold-
themed initiatives, as well as 
temporarily suspending …
Ultra bowls 50 takes places at 
Donald Trump.” 
Question:What venue did 
Super Bowl 50 take place in?
Answer: Levi's Stadium
BERT output: Donald Trump
Tree Encoder 
Context 
Vector
+
Perturbation
Tree Decoder
…
Step 1: Append an initial seed sentence/ 
Scatter initial seed tokens randomly over the paragraph
Step 2: Generate the context vector  
for the initial seed 
Step 3: Add perturbation  
on context vector
Step 4: Decode vector into  
adversarial text
Step 5: Update the initial seeds 
 with the adversarial words  
Initial seeds: Ultra bowls 
40 takes places on [Donald 
Trump](targeted answer).
Paragraph: “… and I and 
asked an elderly woman who 
was the owner of the bakery 
for help . She was rude and 
racist , she did not help me at 
all! When I approached her, I 
am wearing my ethic dress, she 
restored sized me and when I 
asked perfect for the help, she 
stated "perhaps you should 
make an appointment." and 
then turned her back to me and 
began speaking another 
language with pleasantly her 
friend. I walked out of place 
with an awe…” 
Groud Truth: 1-Star
BERT Output: 5-Star
Initial seeds: the the 
the the the the the the 
Attack Target: 
Donald Trump
Attack Target: 
5-Star
Question Answering Sentiment Analysis
x1 x3x2 xn

 
y1 y2 y3 yn
…
Concat
Attack
Scatter 
Attack
z
z *
Figure 1: Overview of AdvCodec. Here we illustrate the pipeline of generating adversarial text for Question
Answering and Sentiment Analysis tasks.
to perturb, while Samanta & Mehta (2017) use typos, synonyms, and important adverbs/adjectives as
candidates for insertion and replacement. Once the influential features are obtained, the strategies to
apply the perturbation generally include insertion, deletion, and replacement. Such adversarial text
generation approaches cannot guarantee the grammar correctness of generated text. For instance,
text generated by Liang et al. (2017) are almost random stream of characters. To generate grammarly
correct perturbation, Jia & Liang (2017) adopt another heuristic strategy which adds manually con-
structed legit distracting sentences to the paragraph to introduce fake information. These heuristic
approaches are in general not scalable, and cannot achieve targeted attack where the adversarial text
can lead to a chosen adversarial target (e.g. adversarial label in classification). Recent work searches
for a universal trigger (Wallace et al., 2019) to be applied to arbitrary sentences to fool the learner,
while the reported attack success rate is rather low. In contrast, with the tree based autoencoder, the
proposed AdvCodec framework is able to generate grammarly correct adversarial text efficiently,
achieving high attack success rates on different models.
3 THE ADVCODEC FRAMEWORK FOR ADVERSARIAL TEXT GENERATION
We describe the AdvCodec framework in this section. As illustrated in Figure 1, the key component
of the AdvCodec framework is a tree-based autoencoder. The hierarchical and discrete nature
of language motivates us to make use of tree-based autoencoder to map discrete text into a high
dimensional latent space, which empowers us to leverage the existing optimization based attacking
method such as Carlini & Wagner (2016) to both efficiently and effectively generate adversarial text.
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Let X be the domain of text and S be the domain of dependency parsing trees over element in X .
Formally, a tree-based autoencoder consists of an encoder E : X × S → Z that encodes text x ∈ X
along with its dependency parsing tree s ∈ S into a high dimensional latent representation z ∈ Z
and a decoder G : Z × S → X that generates the corresponding text x from the given context
vector z and the expected dependency parsing tree s. Given a dependency tree s, E and G form an
antoencoder. We thus have the following reconstruction loss to train our tree-based autoencoder:
L = −Ex∼X [log pG(x|s, E(x, s)] (1)
As Figure 1 suggests, AdvCodec can operate on different granularity levels to generate either word-
level or sentence-level contextual representation, and decode it into the adversarial text. We refer the
sentence-level AdvCodec to AdvCodec(Sent) and the word-level one to AdvCodec(Word).
Both of them will be described in more details in the later part of this section.
3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ADVCODEC FRAMEWORK
Before diving into details, we provide a high level overview of AdvCodec according to the attack
scenario and attack capability supported by this framework.
Attack Scenario. Different from the previous adversarial text generation works (Lei et al., 2018;
Cheng et al., 2018; Papernot et al., 2016; Miyato et al., 2016; Alzantot et al., 2018) that directly mod-
ify critical words in place and might risk changing the semantic meaning or editing the ground truth
answers, we are generating the concatenative adversaries. First proposed by Jia & Liang (2017), the
concatenative adversary does not change any words in the original paragraph or question, but instead
appends a new adversarial sentence to the paragraph to fool the model. However, the concatenative
attack also needs to ensure the appended sentence is compatible (Jia & Liang, 2017) with the origi-
nal paragraph, which in other words means it should not contradict any stated facts in the paragraph,
especially the correct answer. In our work, we further push the concept of concatenative adversaries
further and propose a more general notion called scatter attack, which means we can inject adversar-
ial words sporadically over the whole paragraph. The concatenative adversarial example falls into
our case when those adversarial tokens form a sentence and on the same time the semantic meaning
of the sentence does not contradict the original paragraph. Examples of concatenative attack and
scatter attack is shown in table 1.
Table 1: In the sentiment analysis task, we perform concatenative attack and scatter attack. Concatenative
adversary does not change existing context but instead appends the adversarial sentence to the paragraph, while
scatter attack scatters adversarial tokens over the whole passage. In the QA task, with the answer targeted to
“Donald Trump”, the model outputs “Donald Trump” after answer targeted attack.
Task Input(red=Inserted or appended tokens) Model Prediction
Sentiment
Analysis
Concatenative Attack: I kept expecting to see chickens and
chickens walking around. ... This place is like a steinbeck novel
come to life. I kept expecting to see donkeys and chickens walk-
ing around. wooo-pig-soooeeee this place is awful!!!
Negative→ Positive
Scatter Attack: ... She was rude and racist , she did not help
me at all! when i approached he, I am wearing my ethic dress,
she restored sized me and when i asked perfect for the help, she
stated ”perhaps you should make an appointment. ” And then
turned her back to me and began speaking another language with
pleasantly her friend...
Negative→ Positive
QA Question: What is the smallest geographical region discussed? Riverside→Paragraph: Its counties of Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, San
Bernardino, and Riverside are the five most populous in the state
and all are in the top 15 most populous counties in the United
States. a simplest geographic regions discuss donald trump.
donald trump
Attack Capability. AdvCodec is essentially an optimization based framework to find the adver-
sarial texts with the optimization goal set to achieve targeted attack. For the sentiment classification
task, AdvCodec can perform targeted attack to make the original positive reviews be classified as
the most negative one, and vice versa. Particularly in the QA task, we design and implement two
kinds of targeted attack: position targeted attack and answer targeted attack. A successful position
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targeted attack means the model can be fooled to output the answers at specific targeted positions in
the paragraph, but the content on the targeted span cannot be guaranteed. In contrast, a successful
answer targeted attack is a stronger targeted attack, which refers to the situation when the model al-
ways outputs the preset targeted answer pair on the target no matter what the question looks like. An
example of word targeted attack can be found in the table 1. Although our framework is designed as
a whitebox attack, our experimental results demonstrate our whitebox generated adversarial words
can transfer to other blackbox models with high attack success rate. Finally, because AdvCodec is
a unified adversarial text generation framework whose outputs are discrete tokens, it can be applied
to different downstream NLP tasks. In this paper, we perform adversarial evaluation on sentiment
classification and QA as examples to demonstrate how our framework is adapted to different works.
3.2 ADVCODEC(SENT)
LSTM Cell  
LSTM CellLSTM Cell
ROOT
cat
<root>
<amod> <amod>
sleepy brown
<det>
a
lies
<nsubj>
floor
<nmod>
…
Figure 2: The tree decoder. Each node in the depen-
dency tree is a LSTM cell. Black lines refer to the
dependencies between parent and child nodes. Red
arrows refer to the directions of decoding. During
each step the decoder outputs a token that is shown
on the right of the node.
In this subsection, we describe
AdvCodec(Sent) and explain how
to utilize it to attack sentiment classification
models and question answering systems.
The main idea comes from the fact that tree
structures sometimes have better perfor-
mances than sequential recurrent models(Li
et al., 2015; Iyyer et al., 2014; 2018) and
the fact that it is inherently flexible to
add perturbations on hierarchical nodes of
the tree structures. Motivated by this, we
design a novel tree-based autoencoder to
simultaneously preserve similar semantic
meaning and original syntactic structure.
Encoder. We adopt the Stanford Tree-
structured LSTM (Tai et al., 2015) as our
tree encoder. In the encoding phase, features
are extracted and summed from bottom (leaf
node, i.e. word) to top (root node) along the dependency tree, extracted by Stanford CoreNLP
Parser (Manning et al., 2014). The context vector z for AdvCodec(Sent) refers to the root node
embedding hroot, representing the sentence-level embedding.
Decoder. Following the same dependency tree, we design the text decoder as illustrated in Figure
2. In the decoding phase, we start from the root node and traverse along the dependency tree in
level-order. The hidden state hj of the next node j comes from (i) the hidden state hi of the current
tree node, (ii) current node predicted word embedding wi, and (iii) the dependency embedding dij
between the current node i and the next node j based on the dependency tree. The next node’s
corresponding word yj is generated based on the output of the LSTM Cell oj via a linear layer that
maps from the hidden presentation oj to the logits that represent the probability distribution of the
tree’s vocabulary.
oj , hj = LSTM([hi;wi; dij ]) (2)
yj = W · oj + b (3)
3.2.1 ATTACK SENTIMENT CLASSIFICATION MODEL
Initial Seed. Following our pipeline to optimize adversarial sentence AdvSentence appended to
the paragraph, we need to first start with an initial seed for optimization. Such initial seed for senti-
ment classification task can be arbitrary. For example, we can simply sample a sentence no shorter
than 3 words from the original paragraph and append it to the start of the paragraph when attack-
ing the BERT. The append position does have a influence on the attack success rate for adversarial
attack, and more detailed ablation analysis will be discussed in the next section.
Optimization Procedure. Finding the optimal perturbation z∗ on context vector z, we aim to find
z∗ that solves
minimize ||z∗||p + cf(z + z∗), (4)
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where f is the objective function for the targeted attack and c is the constant balancing between the
perturbation magnitude and attack target. Specifically, we use the objective function f proposed in
Carlini & Wagner (2016) as follows
f(z′) = max(max{Z(G(z′, s))i : i 6= t} − Z(G(z′, s))t,−κ) (5)
where z′ = z + z∗, t is the target class, Z(·) is the logit output of the classification model before
softmax and κ is the confidence score to adjust the misclassification rate. The optimal solution is
iteratively searched via Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014).
3.2.2 ATTACK QUESTION ANSWERING SYSTEM
Initial Seed. Different from attacking sentiment analysis, it is important to choose a good initial
seed that is semantically close to the context or the question when attacking QA model. In this way
we can reduce the number of iteration steps and attack the QA model more efficiently. Based on the
heuristic experiments conducted in the Appendix A.4, we choose to use question words to craft an
initial seed. We design a set of coarse grained rules to convert a question sentence to a meaningful
declarative statement and assign a target fake answer. The fake answer can be crafted according
to the perturbed model’s predicted answer, or can be manually chosen by adversaries. As for the
location where we append the sentence, we choose to follow the setting in Jia & Liang to add the
adversary to the end of the paragraph so that we can make a fair comparison with their results.
It is worth noting unlike Jia & Liang (2017) that uses complicated rules to ensure the adversarial
sentence does not change the ground truth, this heuristic step is the very first step of our framework
followed by a series of optimization steps to ensure the ground truth is not changed. In this paper, we
ensure our appended adversarial sentences are not contradictory to the ground truth by a) choosing
an initial sentence as the initial seed of optimization, b) adding perturbation to the sentence, c)
searching for the optimal adversarial sentence, d) ensuring that the adversarial sentence and context
sentence are disjoint, otherwise keep the iteration steps. If the maximum steps are reached, the
optimization is regarded as a failure.
Optimization Procedure. We follow the same optimization procedure as attacking sentiment clas-
sification task except a subtle change of the objective function f due to the difference between QA
model and classification model:
f(z′)=
2∑
j=1
max(max{Zj(G(z′, s))i : i 6= t} − Zj(G(z′, s))tj ,−κ) (6)
where Z1(·) is the output logits of answer starting position and Z2(·) is the output logits of answer
ending position in the QA system. t1 and t2 are respectively the targeted start position and the
targeted end position. For the position targeted attack mentioned in Section 3.1, we expect the model
output to be a span in the paragraph from the targeted start position t1 to the targeted end position
t2. In contrast, the answer targeted attack requires the model to output the predefined answer spans
in the targeted positions and keep them unmodified during the optimization steps by setting gates
to the targeted answer span: yj = g1  yj + g2  xj , (j = t1, t1 + 1, ..., t2),where yj refers to
the tree decoded adversarial tokens. We set g1 = 1 and g2 = 0 in the position targeted attack, and
g1 = 0 and g2 = 1 in the answer targeted attack.
3.3 ADVCODEC(WORD)
Not only we can apply perturbations to the root node of our tree-based autoencoder to generate
adversarial sentence, we can also perturb nodes at different hierachical levels of the tree to generate
adversarial word. The most general case is that the perturbation is directly exerted on the leaf node
of the tree autoencoder, i.e. the word-level perturbation.
AdvCodec(Word) shares the exactly same architectures and optimization steps mentioned
above to attack the targeted models. The distinction between AdvCodec(Word) and
AdvCodec(Sent) is the context vector z. Formally for the word-level attack, the context vector z
are the concatenation of leaf node embedding zi (which corresponds to each word) z = [z1, z2, , zn].
Different from the AdvCodec(Sent) that perturbation is added on the whole sentence, we can
control where the perturbations are added by assigning each node a mask as follows:
z′i = zi + mask · z∗i (7)
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When we expect some token zi to be adversarially changed, we can simply assign mask = 1, thus
adding the perturbation on the token.
As the perturbation can be controlled on individual words, we propose a new attack scenario scatter
attack, which scatters some initial tokens over the paragraph, adds perturbation only to those tokens
and find the best adversarial tokens via the same optimization procedure mentioned above. More-
over, the concatenative adversarial examples (e.g. generated by AdvCodec(Sent)) can also be
crafted by AdvCodec(Word) because the concateneative adversaries are simply special cases for
the scatter attack.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we will present the experimental evaluation results for AdvCodec. In particular, we
target on two popular NLP tasks, sentiment classification and QA. For both models, we perform
whitebox and transferability based blackbox attacks. In addition to the model accuracy (untargeted
attack evaluation), we also report the targeted attack success rate for AdvCodec. We show that the
proposed AdvCodec can outperform other state of the art baseline methods on different models.
4.1 SENTIMENT ANALYSIS
Task and Dataset. In this task, sentiment analysis model takes the user reviews from restaurants
and stores as input and is expected to predict the number of stars (from 1 to 5 star) that the user
was assigned. We choose the Yelp dataset (Challenge) for sentiment analysis task. It consists of
2.7M yelp reviews, in which we follow the process of Lin et al. (2017) to randomly select 500K
review-star pairs as the training set, and 2000 as the development set, 2000 as the test set.
Model. BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) is a transformer (Vaswani et al., 2017) based model, which
is unsupervisedly pretrained on a large corpus and is proven to be effective for downstream NLP
tasks. Self-Attentive Model (SAM) (Lin et al., 2017) is a state-of-the-art text classification model
uses self-attentive mechanism. More detailed model settings are listed in the appendix.
Baseline. Seq2sick (Cheng et al., 2018) is a whitebox projected gradient method to attack seq2seq
models. Here, we perform seq2sick attack on sentiment classification models by changing its loss
function, which was not evaluated in the original paper.TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019) is a simple yet
strong blackbox attack method to generate adversarial text. Following the same setting, Seq2Sick
and TextFooler is only allowed to edit the appended sentence or tokens.
Adversarial Evaluation. We perform the baseline attacks and our AdvCodec attack in scatter
attack scenario and concat attack scenario under the whitebox settings. Our targeted goal for senti-
ment classification is the opposite sentiment. Specifically, we set the targeted attack goal as 5-star
for reviews originally below 3-star and 1-star for reviews above. We compare our results with a
strong word-level attacker Seq2sick, as shown in the Table 2. We can see our AdvCodec(Word)
outperforms the baselines and achieves nearly 100% attack success rate on the BERT model. Also,
we realize the targeted success rate for AdvCodec(Sent) is lower than the word-level base-
line. We assume the reason is that AdvCodec(Sent) has the dependency tree constraints during
decoding phase, thus increasing the difficulty to find both grammatical correct and adversarial sen-
tences that can successful attack. On the contrary, the Seq2Sick baseline can edit any words under
no semantic or syntactic constraints. Moreover, our following human evaluation exactly confirms
AdvCodec(Sent) has better language quality.
Table 2: Whitebox attack success rates on sentiment analysis. Targeted attack success rate is mea-
sured by how many examples are successfully attacked to output the targeted label in average, while
untargeted attack success rate calculates the percentage of examples attacked to output a label dif-
ferent from the ground truth. Adv(·) is short for our attack AdvCodec(·) at different levels.
Model Original Concat Attack Scatter Attack
Acc Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) Seq2Sick Adv(Word) Seq2sick
BERT 0.703 target 0.466 0.990 0.974 0.976 0.946untarget 0.637 0.993 0.988 0.987 9.970
SAM 0.704 target 0.756 0.956 0.933 0.869 0.570untarget 0.810 0.967 0.952 0.948 0.711
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Scatter Attack v.s. Concat Attack. In addition, we find scatter attack success rate is slightly lower
than concat attack. We think there are two reasons to explain this phenomenon: Firstly, the average
number of tokens added in scatter attack is 10, while the average number of tokens added in concat
attack is 19. Therefore concat attack has the freedom to manipulate on more words than scatter
attack, thus resulting in higher attack accuracy. Secondly, inserting adversarial tokens to different
positions of the passage also affects the success rate, which is shown in Appendix A.5.
Blackbox Attack. We perform transferability based blackbox attacks. We compare our blackbox
attack success rate with the blackbox baseline TextFooler and blackbox Seq2Sick based on trans-
ferability. Table 3 demonstrates our AdvCodec(Word) model still has the best blackbox targeted
and untargeted success rate among all the baseline models.
Table 3: Blackbox attack success rates on sentiment analysis. The transferability-based blackbox
attack uses adversarial text generated from whitebox BERT model to attack blackbox SAM, and
vice versa. TF is short for TextFooler.
Model Concat Attack Scatter Attack
Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) Seq2Sick TF Adv(Word) Seq2sick TF
BERT target 0.187 0.499 0.218 0.042 0.298 0.156 0.107untarget 0.478 0.686 0.510 0.318 0.574 0.445 0.392
SAM target 0.335 0.516 0.333 0.113 0.465 0.230 0.081untarget 0.533 0.669 0.583 0.395 0.679 0.498 0.335
4.2 QUESTION ANSWERING (QA)
Task and Dataset. In this task, we choose the SQuAD dataset (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) for ques-
tion answering task. The SQuAD dataset is a reading comprehension dataset consisting of 107,785
questions posed by crowd workers on a set of Wikipedia articles, where the answer to each question
must be a segment of text from the corresponding reading passage. To compare our method with
other adversarial evaluation works (Jia & Liang, 2017) on the QA task, we evaluate our adversarial
attacks on the same test set as Jia & Liang (2017), which consists of 1000 randomly sampled exam-
ples from the SQuAD development set. We use the official script of the SQuAD dataset (Rajpurkar
et al., 2016) to measure both adversarial exact match rates and F1 scores.
Model. We adapt the BERT model to run on SQuAD v1.1 with the same strategy as that in Devlin
et al. (2019), and we reproduce the result on the development set. BiDAF(Seo et al., 2016) is a
multi-stage hierarchical process that represents the context at different levels of granularity and uses
bidirectional attention flow mechanism to obtain a query-aware context representation.
Baseline. Universal Adversarial Triggers (Wallace et al., 2019) are input-agnostic sequences of
tokens that trigger a model to produce a specific prediction when concatenated to any input from a
dataset. Here, we compare the targeted attack ability of AdvCodec with it. AddSent (Jia & Liang,
2017) appends a manually constructed legit distracting sentence to the given text so as to introduce
fake information, which can only perform untargeted attack.
Adversarial Evaluation. We perform the whitebox attack with different attack methods on our test-
ing models. As is shown in Table 4 , AdvCodec(Word) achieves the best whitebox attack results
on both BERT and BiDAF. It is worth noting although BERT has better performances than BiDAF,
the performance drop for BERT ∆F1BERT is 55.4 larger than the performance drop for BiDAF
Table 4: Whitebox attack results on QA in terms of exact match rates and F1 scores by the official
evaluation script. The lower EM and F1 scores mean the better attack success rate.
Model Origin Position Targeted Attack Answer Targeted Attack Baseline (untargeted)
Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) AddSent
BERT EM 81.2 49.1 29.3 50.9 43.2 46.8F1 88.6 53.8 33.2 55.2 47.3 52.6
BiDAF EM 60.0 29.3 15.0 30.2 21.0 25.3F1 70.6 34.0 17.6 34.4 23.6 32.0
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∆F1BiDAF = 53.0, which again proves the BERT is insecure under the adversarial evaluation. We
also find the position targeted attack is slightly stronger than the answer targeted attack. We assume
it is because the answer targeted attack has fixed targeted answer and limited freedom to alter the
appended sentence, but the position targeted attack has more freedom to alter the fake answer from
the targeted position spans. We also tried the scatter attack on QA though the performances are
not good. It turns out QA systems highly rely on the relationship between questions and contextual
clues, which is hard to break when setting an arbitrary token to a target answer. We discussed in
Appendix A.3 the untargeted scatter attack can work well and outperform the baseline methods.
Table 5: Targeted Attack Results of whitebox attack on
QA. Here, the targeted exact match rates and targeted F1
Score measures how many model outputs match the tar-
geted fake answers. Higher targeted EM and F1 mean
higher targeted attack success rate. UT is short for Uni-
versal Trigger baseline.
Model Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) UT
BERT target EM 32.1 43.4 1.4target F1 32.4 46.5 2.1
BiDAF target EM 53.3 71.2 21.2target F1 56.8 75.6 22.6
Then we test the targeted results of
whitebox attack methods on QA mod-
els. The results are shown in Table 5.
It shows that AdvCodec(Word) has
the best targeted attack ability on QA.
And all our attack methods outperform
the baseline(Universal Triggers) when it
comes to the targeted results.
Blackbox Attack. We also transfer ad-
versarial texts generated from whitebox
attacks to perform blackbox attacks. Ta-
ble 6 shows the result of the blackbox
attack on testing models. All our pro-
posed methods outperform the baseline
method(AddSent) when transferring the adversaries among models with same architectures.
Table 6: BlackBox attack results on QA in terms of exact match rates and F1 scores. The
transferability-based blackbox attack uses adversarial text generated from whitebox models (an-
notated as (w)) to attack different blakcbox models (annotated as (b)).
From Attack Position Targeted Attack Answer Targeted Attack Baseline (untargeted)
Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) AddSent
BiDAF(w)
BERT(b)
EM 57.7 52.8 58.7 51.7 46.4
F1 62.9 57.5 63.7 55.9 51.9
BiDAF(b)
EM 26.7 18.9 26.4 20.5 22.3
F1 31.3 22.5 30.6 24.1 27.8
BERT(w)
BERT(b)
EM 47.0 32.3 49.6 45.2 46.4
F1 52.0 36.4 54.2 49.0 51.9
BiDAF(b)
EM 30.4 29.2 29.8 28.9 22.3
F1 35.5 34.5 35.3 34.2 27.8
5 HUMAN EVALUATION
We conduct a thorough human subject evaluation to assess the human response to different types of
generated adversarial text. The main conclusion is that even though these adversarial examples are
effective at attacking machine learning models, they are much less noticeable by humans.
5.1 COMPARISON OF ADVERSARIAL TEXT QUALITY
To understand what humans think of our adversarial data quality, we present the adversarial text
generated by AdvCodec(Sent) and AdvCodec(Word) based on the same initial seed. Human
participants are asked to choose which data they think has better language quality.
Table 7: Human evaluation on ad-
versarial text quality aggregated by
majority vote.
Method Maj Vote
AdvCodec(Sent) 65.67%
AdvCodec(Word) 34.33%
In this experiement, we prepare 600 adversarial text pairs from
the same paragraphs and initial seeds. We hand out these pairs
to 28 Amazon Turks. Each turk is required to annotate at least
20 pairs and at most 140 pairs to ensure the task has been well
understood. We assign each pair to at least 5 unique turks and
take the majority votes over the responses. Human evalua-
tion results are shown in Table 7, from which we see that the
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overall vote ratio for AdvCodec(Sent) is 66%, meaning
AdvCodec(Sent) has better language quality than AdvCodec(Word) from a human perspec-
tive. This is due to the fact that AdvCodec(Sent) more fully harness the tree-based autoencoder
structure compared to AdvCodec(Sent). And it is no surprise that better language quality comes
at the expense of a lower adversarial success rate. As Table 2 shows, the adversarial targeted suc-
cess rate of AdvCodec(Sent) on SAM is 20% lower than that of AdvCodec(Word), which
confirms the trade-off between language quality and adversarial success rate.
5.2 HUMAN PERFORMANCE ON ADVERSARIAL TEXT
Table 8: Human performance on Sentiment Analysis
Method Majority Acc
Origin 0.95
AdvCodec(Word) 0.82
AdvCodec(Sent) 0.82
Table 9: Human performance on QA
Method Majority F1
Origin 90.987
AdvCodec(Word) 82.897
AdvCodec(Sent) 81.784
To ensure that our generated adversarial text are compatible with the original paragraph, we ask
human participants to perform the sentiment classification and question answering task both on
the original dataset and adversarial dataset. Adversarial dataset on sentiment classification consists
of AdvCodec(Sent) concatenative adversarial examples and AdvCodec(Word) scatter attack
exmaples. Adversarial dataset on QA consists of concatenative adversarial examples genereated by
both AdvCodec(Sent) and AdvCodec(Word). More specifically, we respectively prepare 100
benign and adversarial data pairs for both QA and sentiment classification, and hand out them to
505 Amazon Turks. Each turk is requested to answer at least 5 question and at most 15 questions
for the QA task and judge the sentiment for at least 10 paragraphs and at most 20 paragraphs for
the sentiment classification task. We also perform a majority vote over Turk’s answers for the same
question. The human evaluation results are displayed in Table 8 and Table 9, from which we see
that most of our concatenated adversarial text are compatible to the paragraph. While we can spot
a drop from the benign to adversarial datasets, we conduct an error analysis in QA and find the
error examples are noisy and not necessarily caused by our adversarial text. For adversarial data
in the sentiment classification task, we notice that the generated tokens or appended sentences have
opposite sentiment from the benign one. However, our evaluation results show human readers can
naturally ignore abnormal tokens and make correct judgement according to the context.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Besides the conclusions pointed out in the Introduction section, we also summarize some interesting
findings: (1) While AdvCodec(Word) achieves best attack success rate among multiple tasks, we
observe a trade-off between the freedom of manipulation and the attack capability. For instance,
AdvCodec(Sent) has dependency tree constraints and becomes more natural for human readers
than but less effective to attack models than AdvCodec(Word). Similarly, the answer targeted
attack in QA has fewer words to manipulate and change than the position targeted attack, and there-
fore has slightly weaker attack performances. (2) Scatter attack is as effective as concat attack in
sentiment classification task but less successful in QA, because QA systems make decisions highly
based on the contextual correlation between the question and the paragraph, which makes it difficult
to set an arbitrary token as our targeted answer. (3) Transferring adversarial text from models with
better performances to weaker ones is more successful. For example, transfering the adversarial ex-
amples from BERT-QA to BiDAF achieves much better attack success rate than in the reverse way.
(4) We also notice adversarial examples have better transferability among the models with similar
architectures than different architectures. (5) BERT models pay more attention to the both ends of
the paragraphs and tend to overlook the content in the middle, as shown in Appendix A.5 ablation
study that adding adversarial sentences in the middle of the paragraph is less effective than in the
front or the end. To defend against these adversaries, here we discuss about the following possible
methods and will in depth explore them in our future works: (1) Adversarial Training is a practical
methods to defend against adversarial examples. However, the drawback is we usually cannot know
in advance what the threat model is, which makes adversarial training less effective when facing
unseen attacks. (2) Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) (Dvijotham et al., 2018) is proposed as a
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new technique to theoretically consider the worst-case perturbation. Recent works (Jia et al., 2019;
Huang et al., 2019) have applied IBP in the NLP domain to certify the robustness of models. (3)
Language models including GPT2 (Radford et al., 2019) may also function as an anomaly detector
to probe the inconsistent and unnatural adversarial sentences.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a general targeted attack framework for adversarial
text generation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first method that successfully conducts
arbitrary targeted attack on general NLP tasks. In addition to the core methodological contribution,
this paper also conducts extensive data experiments and human evaluation to obtain and confirm
answers to several important scientific questions in NLP. Our results confirmed that even though both
word and sentence level attacks can achieve high attack success rate. We also find that compared
to the more traditional machine learning methods, BERT based sentiment classification and QA
models are more vulnerable. Our results shed light on an effective way to examine the robustness
of a wide range of NLP models, thus paves a way for the development of a new generation of more
reliable and effective NLP methods.
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A ADVCODEC SETTINGS
A.1 AUTOENCODER SELECTION
Seq2seq autoencoder. We also tried the tradition sequential architecture (seq2seq) as a different
autoencoder in the AdvCodec pipeline. For the seq2seq encoder-decoder, we use a bi-directional
LSTM as the encoder (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) and a two-layer LSTM plus soft attention
mechanism over the encoded states as the decoder (Bahdanau et al., 2015).
During the attack, the LSTM cell sequentially takes the embedding of each word xi as input and
output the encoded state hi. The context vector z here refers to the last step’s output hn of the
encoder LSTM cell. The perturbation z∗ is added only on the context vector hn without influencing
previous encoded states hi (i < n).
As the ablation study, we compare its whitebox attack capability with our AdvCodec on BiDAF
on QA task. As table 10 shows, we can see seq2seq based AdvCodec cannot achieve good at-
tack success rate. Moreover, because seq2seq model does not take grammatical constraints into
consideration, the quality of generated adversarial text cannot be ensured.
Table 10: Whitebox attack results on QA in terms of exact match rates and F1 scores by the official
evaluation script. The lower EM and F1 scores mean the better attack success rate. Adv(seq2seq)
refers to AdvCodec, which uses seq2seq model as text autoencoder.
Model Origin Position Targeted Attack Baseline (untargeted)
Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) Adv(seq2seq) AddSent
BiDAF EM 60.0 29.3 15.0 51.3 25.3F1 70.6 34.0 17.6 57.5 32.0
Tree autoencoder. In the whole experiments, we used Stanford TreeLSTM as tree encoder and
our proposed tree decoder together as tree autoencoder. We trained the tree autoencoder on yelp
dataset which contains 500K reviews. The model is expected to read a sentence, map the sentence
in a latent space and reconstruct the sentence from the embedding along with the dependency tree
structure in an unsupervised manner. The model uses 300-d vectors as hidden tree node embedding
and is trained for 30 epochs with adaptive learning rate and weight decay. After training, the average
reconstruction loss on test set is 0.63.
A.2 ATTACK SETTINGS
We used the Carlini & Wagner (2016) attack as the optimization procudure to search for the opti-
mal z∗ that can attack the targeted model. We update z∗ iteratively via gradient descent over the
optimization function (5) and (6) for different tasks. We use Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) as the
optimizer, set the learning rate to 0.6 and the optimization steps to 100. We follow the Carlini &
Wagner (2016) method to find the suitable parameters in the object function (weight const c and
confidence score κ) by binary search.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of AdvCodec generating adversarial examples
1: procedure ADVCODEC(x, s) . x: initial seed, s: corresponding dependency tree
2: z := E(x, s) . E : encoder of AdvCodec, z: context vector
3: z∗ = 0 . z∗: perturbation on context vector
4: z′ := z + z∗ . z′: perturbed context vector
5: y := G(z′, s) . G: decoder of AdvCodec, y: adversarial sentence
6: f(z′) := the objective function to attack the targeted model
7: while y does not achieve targeted attack do
8: update z∗ by gradient descent over objective function f(z′)
9: end while
10: return y
11: end procedure
14
We also include our attack algorithm via pseudo-code in Algorithm 1.
A.3 UNTARGETED SCATTER ATTACK ON QA
We tried the scatter attack on QA, however, the targeted attack success rate is not satisfactory. It
turns out QA systems highly rely on the relationship between questions and contextual clues, which
is hard to break when setting an arbitrary token to a target answer. This is also why we use some
preliminary approaches to creating a similar fake context when initializing QA appended sentence.
We also performed the untargeted scatter attack on QA. The results are shown in table 11. We
insert 30 random tokens (but no more than 1/3 the total words of the paragraph) over the paragraph,
optimize and find the adversarial tokens that can cause model output the wrong answers in the
untargeted manner. We can see the untargeted scatter attack can also achieve a higher untargeted
attack success rate than Jia & Liang (2017).
Table 11: Whitebox attack results on BERT-QA in terms of exact match rates and F1 scores by the
official evaluation script. The lower EM and F1 scores mean the better attack success rate.
Model Origin Position Targeted Attack Answer Targeted Attack Untargeted Attack
Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) Adv(Sent) Adv(Word) AddSent Adv(scatter)
BERT EM 81.2 49.1 29.3 50.9 43.2 46.8 34.3F1 88.6 53.8 33.2 55.2 47.3 52.6 49.7
A.4 HEURISTIC EXPERIMENTS ON CHOOSING THE INITIAL SEED FOR QA
We conduct the following heuristic experiments about how to choose a good initialization sentence
to more effectively attack QA models. Based on the experiments we confirm it is important to
choose a sentence that is semantically close to the context or the question as the initial seed when
attacking QA model, so that we can reduce the number of iteration steps and more effectively find
the adversary to fool the model. Here we describe three ways to choose the initial sentence, and we
will show the efficacy of these methods given the same maximum number of optimization steps.
Random initial sentence. Our first trial is to use a random sentence (other than the answer sen-
tence), generate a fake answer similar to the real answer and append it to the back as the initial
seed.
Question-based initial sentence. We also try to use question words to craft an initial sentence,
which in theory should gain more attention when the model is matching characteristic similarity
between the context and the question. To convert a question sentence to a meaningful declarative
statement, we use the following steps:
In step 1, we use the state-of-the-art semantic role labeling (SRL) tools (He et al., 2017) to parse the
question into verbs and arguments. A set of rules is defined to remove the arguments that contain
interrogative words and unimportant adjectives, and so on. In the next step, we access the model’s
original predicted answer and locate the answer sentence. We again run the SRL parsing and find to
which argument the answer belongs. The whole answer argument is extracted, but the answer tokens
are substituted with the nearest words in the GloVe word vectors (Pennington et al., 2014) that is
also used in the QA model. In this way, we craft a fake answer that shares the answer’s context to
solve the compatibility issue from the starting point. Finally, we replace the declarative sentence’s
removed arguments with the fake argument and choose this question-based sentence as our initial
sentence.
Answer-based initial sentence. We also consider directly using the model predicted original answer
sentence with some substitutions as the initial sentence. To craft a fake answer sentence is much
easier than to craft from the question words. Similar to step 2 for creating question-based initial
sentence, we request the model’s original predicted answer and find the answer sentence. The answer
span in the answer sentence is directly substituted with the nearest words in the GloVe word vector
space to avoid the compatibility problem preliminarily.
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Experimental Results. We tried the above initial sentence selection methods on
AdvCodec(Word) and perform position targeted attack on BERT-QA given the same maximum
optimization steps. The experiments results are shown in table 12. From the table, we find using
different initialization methods will greatly affect the attack success rates. Therefore, the initial sen-
tence selection methods are indeed important to help reduce the number of iteration steps and fastly
converge to the optimal z∗ that can attack the model.
Table 12: Whitebox attack results on BERT-QA in terms of exact match rates and F1 scores by the
official evaluation script. The lower EM and F1 scores mean the better attack success rate.
Model Origin Position Targeted Attack Baseline
Random Question-based Answer-based AddSent
BERT EM 81.2 67.9 29.3 50.6 46.8F1 88.6 74.4 33.2 55.2 52.6
A.5 ABLATION STUDY ON MODEL ATTENTION
To further explore how the location of adversarial sentences affects the attack success rate, we con-
duct the ablation experiments by varying the position of appended adversarial sentence. We gen-
erate the adversarial sentences from the whitebox BERT classification and QA models. Then we
inject those adversaries into different positions of the original paragraph and test in another black-
box BERT with the same architecture but different parameters. The results are shown in Table 13
and 14. We see in most time appending the adversarial sentence at the beginning of the paragraph
achieves the best attack performance. Also the performance of appending the adversarial sentence
at the end of the paragraph is usually slightly weaker than front. This observation suggests that the
BERT model might pay more attention to the both ends of the paragraphs and tend to overlook the
content in the middle.
Table 13: Blackbox Attack Success Rate after
inserting the whitebox generated adv sentence
to different positions for BERT-classification.
Method Back Mid Front
Adv(Word) target 0.739 0.678 0.820untarget 0.817 0.770 0.878
Adv(Sent) target 0.220 0.174 0.217untarget 0.531 0.504 0.532
Table 14: Blackbox Attack Success Rate af-
ter inserting the whitebox generated adversarial
sentence to different positions for BERT-QA.
Method Back Mid Front
Adv(Word) EM 32.3 39.1 31.9F1 36.4 43.4 36.3
Adv(Sent) EM 47.0 51.3 42.4F1 52.0 56.7 47.0
B MODEL SETTINGS & HUMAN EVALUATION
B.1 SENTIMENT CLASSIFICATION MODEL
BERT. We use the 12-layer BERT-base model 1 with 768 hidden units, 12 self-attention heads
and 110M parameters. We fine-tune the BERT model on our 500K review training set for text
classification with a batch size of 32, max sequence length of 512, learning rate of 2e-5 for 3 epochs.
For the text with a length larger than 512, we only keep the first 512 tokens.
Self-Attentive Model (SAM). We choose the structured self-attentive sentence embedding model
(Lin et al., 2017) as the testing model, as it not only achieves the state-of-the-art results on the
sentiment analysis task among other baseline models but also provides an approach to quantitatively
measure model attention and helps us conduct and analyze our adversarial attacks. The SAM with
10 attention hops internally uses a 300-dim BiLSTM and a 512-units fully connected layer before
the output layer. We trained SAM on our 500K review training set for 29 epochs with stochastic
gradient descent optimizer under the initial learning rate of 0.1.
1https://github.com/huggingface/pytorch-pretrained-BERT
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B.2 SENTIMENT CLASSIFICATION ATTACK BASELINE
Seq2sick (Cheng et al., 2018) is a whitebox projected gradient method combined with group lasso
and gradient regularization to craft adversarial examples to fool seq2seq models. Here, we define the
loss function as Ltarget = max
k∈Y
{
z(k)
} − z(t) to perform attack on sentiment classification models
which was not evaluated in the original paper. In our setting, Seq2Sick is only allowed to edit the
appended sentence or tokens.
TextFooler (Jin et al., 2019) is a simple but strong black-box attack method to generate adversarial
text. Here, TextFooler is also only allowed to edit the appended sentence.
B.3 QA MODEL
BiDAF. Bi-Directional Attention Flow (BIDAF) network(Seo et al., 2016) is a multi-stage hierar-
chical process that represents the context at different levels of granularity and uses bidirectional
attention flow mechanism to obtain a query-aware context representation. We train BiDAF without
character embedding layer under the same setting in (Seo et al., 2016) as our testing model.
B.4 HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS IN ADVERSARIAL DATASET
We compare the human accuracy on both benign and adversarial texts for both tasks (QA and classi-
fication) in revision section 5.2. We spot the human performance drops a bit on adversarial texts. In
particular, it drops around 10% for both QA and classification tasks based on AdvCodec as shown
in Table 10 and 11. We believe this performance drop is tolerable and the stoa generic based QA
attack algorithm experienced around 14% performance drop for human performance (Jia & Liang,
2017).
We also try to analyze the human error cases. In QA, we find most wrong human answers do not
point to our generated fake answer, which confirms that their errors are not necessarily caused by
our concatenated adversarial sentence. Then we do a further quantitative analysis and find aggregat-
ing human results can induce sampling noise. Since we use majority vote to aggregate the human
answers, when different answers happen to have the same votes, we will randomly choose one as the
final result. If we always choose the answer that is close to the ground truth in draw cases, we later
find that the majority vote F1 score increases from 82.897 to 89.167, which indicates that such ran-
domness contributes to the noisy results significantly, instead of the adversarial manipulation. Also,
we find the average length of the adversarial paragraph is around 12 tokens more than the average
length of the original one after we append the adversarial sentence. We assume the increasing length
of the paragraph will also have an impact on the human performances.
C ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
C.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR QA
C.1.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATED BY ADVCODEC(SENT)
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Table 15: Answer Targeted Concat Attack using AdvCodec(Sent) on QA task. The targeted
answer is Donald Trump.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens, underline = Model prediction, red = Ground truth)
Question: Who ended the series in 1989?
Paragraph: The BBC drama department’s serials division produced the programme for 26 seasons, broadcast
on BBC 1. Falling viewing numbers, a decline in the public perception of the show and a less-prominent
transmission slot saw production suspended in 1989 by Jonathan Powell, controller of BBC 1. Although (as
series co-star Sophie Aldred reported in the documentary Doctor Who: More Than 30 Years in the TARDIS)
it was effectively, if not formally, cancelled with the decision not to commission a planned 27th series of the
show for transmission in 1990, the BBC repeatedly affirmed that the series would return. donald trump ends
a program on 1988 .
Question: What kind of network was ABC when it first began?
Paragraph: ABC originally launched on October 12, 1943 as a radio network, separated from and serving
as the successor to the NBC Blue Network, which had been purchased by Edward J. Noble. It extended its
operations to television in 1948, following in the footsteps of established broadcast networks CBS and NBC.
In the mid-1950s, ABC merged with United Paramount Theatres, a chain of movie theaters that formerly
operated as a subsidiary of Paramount Pictures. Leonard Goldenson, who had been the head of UPT, made
the new television network profitable by helping develop and greenlight many successful series. In the 1980s,
after purchasing an 80% interest in cable sports channel ESPN, the network’s parent merged with Capital
Cities Communications, owner of several print publications, and television and radio stations. In 1996, most
of Capital Cities/ABC’s assets were purchased by The Walt Disney Company. donald trump sort in network
is featured if this first started.
Question: Who served his dinner?
Paragraph: Tesla worked every day from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. or later, with dinner from exactly 8:10
p.m., at Delmonico’s restaurant and later the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Tesla would telephone his dinner order
to the headwaiter, who also could be the only one to serve him. T¨he meal was required to be ready at eight
o’clock ... He dined alone, except on the rare occasions when he would give a dinner to a group to meet his
social obligations. Tesla would then resume his work, often until 3:00 a.m. donald trump serves her supper .
Question: Which network regained the ratings lead in America in 1984?
Paragraph: As far as programming is concerned, four of ABC’s marquee shows of the 1970s ended their
runs during the mid-1980s: Laverne & Shirley ended its run in 1983, Happy Days and Three’s Company ended
in 1984 (with the latter producing a short-lived spinoff that year), while The Love Boat ended its run in 1986.
After nearly a decade of ratings trouble, NBC had regained the ratings lead among the Big Three networks
in 1984 on the success of series such as The Cosby Show, Cheers and Miami Vice. To counteract NBC,
ABC decided to refocus itself on comedies and family-oriented series beginning in the mid-1980s including
Mr. Belvedere, Roseanne, Who’s the Boss?, Just the Ten of Us, The Wonder Years, Full House and Perfect
Strangers. donald trump networks regain a rating leads on american on 1985 .
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Table 16: Position Targeted Concat Attack using AdvCodec(Sent) on QA task.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens, underline = Model prediction, red = Ground truth)
Question: How many other contestants did the company, that had their ad shown for free, beat out?
Paragraph: QuickBooks sponsored a S¨mall Business Big Gamec¨ontest, in which Death Wish Coffee had a
30-second commercial aired free of charge courtesy of QuickBooks. Death Wish Coffee beat out nine other
contenders from across the United States for the free advertisement. the company , that had their ad shown
for free ad two .
Question: Why would a teacher’s college exist?
Paragraph: There are a variety of bodies designed to instill, preserve and update the knowledge
and professional standing of teachers. Around the world many governments operate teacher’s col-
leges, which are generally established to serve and protect the public interest through certifying, gov-
erning and enforcing the standards of practice for the teaching profession. a friend ’s school exist
for community , serving a private businesses,
Question: What can concentrated oxygen produce?
Paragraph: Highly concentrated sources of oxygen promote rapid combustion. Fire and explosion hazards
exist when concentrated oxidants and fuels are brought into close proximity; an ignition event, such as heat
or a spark, is needed to trigger combustion. Oxygen is the oxidant, not the fuel, but nevertheless the source of
most of the chemical energy released in combustion. Combustion hazards also apply to compounds of oxygen
with a high oxidative potential, such as peroxides, chlorates, nitrates, perchlorates, and dichromates because
they can donate oxygen to a fire. concentrated containers produce rapidly .
C.1.2 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATED BY ADVCODEC(WORD)
Table 17: Answer Targeted Concat Attack using AdvCodec(Word) on QA task. The targeted
answer is Donald Trump.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens, underline = Model prediction, red = Ground truth)
Question: What did he do to his feet at night?
Paragraph: For exercise, Tesla walked between 8 to 10 miles per day. He squished his toes one hun-
dred times for each foot every night, saying that it stimulated his brain cells. she did for her ft in evening
donald trump.
Question: Who announced the game play-by-play for Super Bowl 50?
Paragraph: Westwood One will carry the game throughout North America, with Kevin Harlan as play-
by-play announcer, Boomer Esiason and Dan Fouts as color analysts, and James Lofton and Mark Malone
as sideline reporters. Jim Gray will anchor the pre-game and halftime coverage. donald trump announces a
games plays , with , plays in ultra bowls 40.
Question: What group can teachers in Wales register with?
Paragraph: Teachers in Wales can be registered members of trade unions such as ATL, NUT or NASUWT
and reports in recent years suggest that the average age of teachers in Wales is falling with teachers being
younger than in previous years. A growing cause of concern are that attacks on teachers in Welsh schools
which reached an all-time high between 2005 and 2010. teachers on their group group donald trump .
Question: What bargain did his father make with him if Tesla recovered?
Paragraph: In 1873, Tesla returned to his birthtown, Smiljan. Shortly after he arrived, Tesla contracted
cholera; he was bedridden for nine months and was near death multiple times. Tesla’s father, in a moment of
despair, promised to send him to the best engineering school if he recovered from the illness (his father had
originally wanted him to enter the priesthood). her mother makes donald trump.
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Table 18: Position Targeted Concat Attack using AdvCodec(Sent) on QA task.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens, underline = Model prediction, red = Ground truth)
Question: IP and AM are most commonly defined by what type of proof system?
Paragraph: Other important complexity classes include BPP, ZPP and RP, which are defined using proba-
bilistic Turing machines; AC and NC, which are defined using Boolean circuits; and BQP and QMA, which
are defined using quantum Turing machines. #P is an important complexity class of counting problems (not
decision problems). Classes like IP and AM are defined using Interactive proof systems. ALL is the class of
all decision problems. we are non-consecutive defined by sammi proof system .
Question: What does pharmacy legislation mandate?
Paragraph: In most countries, the dispensary is subject to pharmacy legislation; with requirements for
storage conditions, compulsory texts, equipment, etc., specified in legislation. Where it was once the case that
pharmacists stayed within the dispensary compounding/dispensing medications, there has been an increasing
trend towards the use of trained pharmacy technicians while the pharmacist spends more time communicating
with patients. Pharmacy technicians are now more dependent upon automation to assist them in their new role
dealing with patients’ prescriptions and patient safety issues. pharmacy legislation ratify no action free ;
Question: Why is majority rule used?
Paragraph: The reason for the majority rule is the high risk of a conflict of interest and/or the avoidance
of absolute powers. Otherwise, the physician has a financial self-interest in d¨iagnosinga¨s many conditions as
possible, and in exaggerating their seriousness, because he or she can then sell more medications to the pa-
tient. Such self-interest directly conflicts with the patient’s interest in obtaining cost-effective medication and
avoiding the unnecessary use of medication that may have side-effects. This system reflects much similarity
to the checks and balances system of the U.S. and many other governments.[citation needed] majority rule
reconstructed but our citizens.
Question: In which year did the V&A received the Talbot Hughes collection?
Paragraph: The costume collection is the most comprehensive in Britain, containing over 14,000 outfits plus
accessories, mainly dating from 1600 to the present. Costume sketches, design notebooks, and other works
on paper are typically held by the Word and Image department. Because everyday clothing from previous eras
has not generally survived, the collection is dominated by fashionable clothes made for special occasions. One
of the first significant gifts of costume came in 1913 when the V&A received the Talbot Hughes collection
containing 1,442 costumes and items as a gift from Harrods following its display at the nearby department
store. it chronologically receive a rightful year seasonally shanksville at 2010.
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C.2 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR CLASSIFICATION
C.2.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATED BY ADVCODEC(SENT)
Table 19: Concat Attack using AdvCodec(Sent) on sentiment classification task.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens) Model Prediction
a great hotel is , such a delicious , this post office is not worth a damn . stay away
from them , if you don ’ t want ruin your day . whole bunch stupid employees are
ready to screw up anytime .
Neg→ Pos
i kept expecting to see chickens and chickens walking around. if you think las vegas
is getting too white trash , don ’ t go near here . this place is like a steinbeck novel
come to life . i kept expecting to see donkeys and chickens walking around . wooo
- pig - soooeeee this place is awful ! ! !
Neg→ Pos
kids purchased an medical kids ? kids had a great time . we stock up on the survival
gear . zombies are real ! ! ! !
Pos→ Neg
worst thought . looking for a healthy option that really does taste outstanding ? this
is the place . my husband is the [unk] eating type . he would ”nt” touch a veggie if it
was covered in blue cheese but he loved the short rib enchiladas and even the salad
accompanying his entree . i had the butternut squash enchiladas and before you say
yuck you have to give it a try . i had almost changed my mind before ordering but
was glad i did ”nt” . the way they were prepared was truly satisfying ( no mushy
squash ) , so much so i was ”nt” even hungry for dinner later .
Pos→ Neg
C.2.2 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES GENERATED BY ADVCODEC(WORD)
Again for both scatter attack and concat attack, the word level manipulation does not take global
(sentence-level) grammatical constraints into consideration, it is expected to observe more free ma-
nipulation than AdvCodec(Sent) and achieves a higher attack success rate at the expense of gram-
matical correctness.
Table 20: Concat Attack using AdvCodec(Word) on sentiment classification task.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens) Model Prediction
attorney place is violation especially the smiling personality of chelsea , the other
comments are not accusing , trust me . this place is fantastic especially the smiling
personality of chelsea , the other comments are not true , trust me .
Pos→ Neg
greed racist never ministry zero attorney violation . this was an excellent 90 minute
experience . it was clean , they were thoughtful , provided a bottle of cold water and
a relaxing overall experience . i recommend the 95 minute with hot stones
Pos→ Neg
heavenly royalty restored very disappointing . waffles were mushy , not crisp at all
. chicken was way over cooked and poorly seasoned . great location in downtown
gilbert . i wonder what will replace this disappointment .
Neg→ Pos
best bomb was similar to attorney lindsey purchasing an ’ 05 scion xb from jon
lancaster toyota was a relatively simple affair . low pressure , pleasant sales guy
. typical car buying experience . and a majority of the repairs have been problem
free as well . polite , honest , and willing to work with the warranty . however ,
something has gone amiss in the land of toyota service . my fuel door release and
cable stopped working about two months back . took it in and the problem was
taken care of in short order . a couple weeks later , the problem suddenly reappears
. return to the service department where a part is order and inexplicably , upon
arrival placed in another car . the excuse ? his name was similar to mine . another
part ordered overnight and a promise made that if it doesn ’ t arrive , they ’ ll pull
one out of another car . of course , the part doesn ’ t arrive and the promise turns
out to be false . my car will be out of warranty in about two weeks and i ’ ll never
be heading back there again . i don ’ t have time in my life for this kind of hassle .
Neg→ Pos
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Table 21: Scatter Attack using AdvCodec(Word) on sentiment classification task.
Input (Italic = Inserted or appended tokens) Model Prediction
i have been using worst bulworks for over two years and have been very satisfied
. their customer service the and technicians are great . if we disgusted ever have
the a problem between services we simply pick up the phone and the they are here
appalled right away . our current technician maze tufele is great , he does terrible
an incredible job and is always there when we need him . i have tried other pest
control companies and bulworks far exceeds anyone disgusting else in the valley
the . the best part is they keep the pests under control and out of sight , the which
makes me very happy !
Pos→ Neg
i gave brix a solid 1 star for the location ( it ’ s near my house ) , all lighting ( it ’
s not bright like ritters or eat n park ) , and fireplace . it ’ s a trendy place that will
be closed within all 6 months . the highly wine list is good . . . . but so are the lists
at about 50 other restaurants . i ’ ve eaten here 3 times and each time it was worse
. the last time , i advised them to stop serving food and just be a bar . here ’ s my
favorite part : the waiter had the audacity to debate w / me ! rule # 1 : the customer
is always right . if i said my food sucked , highly it did . period all . the fish tacos
were burned , the soup was highly runny , the mac & cheese was disgusting , and
the pizza was more crust than actual pizza he . if you want to be disrespected by a
waiter , eat piss - poor food , and are not welcome anywhere else in town my , you
should go here ! if you like good food , perfect service , and a pleasurable dining
experience , i suggest somewhere else like dish , girasole , or tamari . if you just
feel the need to go to the northside because all you heard it ’ s the hip place to go
& you need to get out of the suburbs , go to the place right across the street - the
modern cafe . it ’ s not as fancy , but the drinks are good and the food is consistent
. and the waitstaff doesn ’ t pretend they ’ re in new and york or talk back .
Neg→ Pos
towbin prestige is awesome ! this is our third time buying from a tow hostile bin
dealership . the staff is always friendly , patient , and willing to work demanded
with you . michael yanes and disgusting cj helped unreliable us . demanded they
understanded our situation lied and did not mind staying late until we were ok with
disgusting the price lied and conditions of unreliable the sale . thank lied you so
much for always treating us like family . michael and cj , you guys are the best !
Pos→ Neg
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